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Highway to controversy:  
The Maine Turnpike and the way life should be 
Maine Policy Review (1997).  Volume 6, Number 2 
 
by Charles S. Colgan  
Whether to widen the turnpike has been a source of heated debate for many years and, despite 
extensive study to clarify the issue, it remains polarized.  Proponents argue that widening is 
critical to the economic health of the state.  Opponents argue that widening will not resolve 
congestion problems over the long haul and advocate for alternatives such as peak-hour tolls.  In 
this forum, Charles Colgan traces the events leading up to the current impasse, covering the 
arguments for and against widening and summarizing the extensive study of the issue.  He 
concludes that widening is necessary but irrelevant to the larger debate at hand, which will not be 
resolved by a six-lane or four-lane turnpike.  
You see the sign about a half-mile after you cross the Piscataqua River bridge from New 
Hampshire into Maine.  Just before the first exit in Maine, a blue sign announces "Welcome to 
Maine: The Way Life Should Be."  At that point the Maine Turnpike does not officially begin for 
five and a half miles, yet as one looks north along the six-lane road toward Portland, Augusta, 
and beyond, the sign's message is as much a challenge as a welcome.  For the highway next to 
that sign has become the center of a controversy - now nearly thirty years old - about what is "the 
way life should be" in Maine.  
A few miles beyond the sign, the Maine Turnpike officially begins and stretches 100 miles to 
Augusta.  It is the most heavily traveled road in Maine, particularly on the stretch between 
Kittery and Portland. Twelve miles north of the sign, the road suddenly and unexpectedly 
narrows to four lanes at an otherwise 
undistinguished point. From that point to mile 42 in South Portland, where high-speed highway 
travel divides between the turnpike heading west of the city to Lewiston and Auburn and 1-295 
and 1-95 through Portland and Brunswick, the roadway is four lanes wide, largely unchanged 
from when it originally was laid out in the early 1940s.  That thirty miles has received more 
attention than any comparable stretch of road in Maine, perhaps in New England, as several 
attempts have been made to widen it to six lanes.  All have been unsuccessful so far. 
One might wonder why the turnpike has been the source of such heated debate over such a long 
period of time.  One also might wonder whether, amid all the heat, any light has been shed on the 
turnpike and its role in Maine's economy and life.   
This article seeks to answer these questions by reviewing the history of the Maine Turnpike 
Authority's attempts to expand the roadway, the most recent detailed analysis of traffic on the 
turnpike and alternatives for managing traffic congestion on the highway, and the major issues 
being debated by proponents and opponents of widening.  It concludes that both the proponents 
and opponents of widening have used the turnpike as the symbolic center of a larger debate 
between competing visions of Maine and in the process have misunderstood, mischaracterized, 
and distorted the key issues about the highway itself. The result is likely to be a continuation of 
the battle whatever the outcome of the 1997 referendum and a Maine that is the sum of the worst 
fears of both sides in the debate. 
FIFTY YEARS OF TRANSPORTATION, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF DEBATE  
The original impetus for the turnpike was traffic congestion, only in this case it was on Route 1.  
In 1941 the Legislature, borrowing an idea from Pennsylvania, established the Maine Turnpike 
Authority as an independent state agency to build and operate a four-lane, divided highway 
between Kittery and Fort Kent.  The Authority began selling the bonds that would finance the 
turnpike and be repaid from tolls toward the end of World War II.  Construction of the road 
between Kittery and Portland got underway in 1944, and the turnpike opened to traffic on 
December 13, 1947. The total cost was $20.6 million. 
The road was an immediate success, and plans soon were set  in motion to extend the road to 
Lewiston-Auburn and Augusta, with a spur to Route 1 in Falmouth.  This extension opened in 
1955. Further development of what has become known as the  Interstate Highway System would 
carry the four-lane, high-speed highway concept to Bangor and on to Houlton, but without tolls, 
which were forbidden by Congress on any highway funded from the interstate highway 
program.  In 1970, the Turnpike Authority directed its consulting engineers to develop a plan for 
the first major improvements to the road.  The engineers' top recommendation was that the 
original road completed in 1947 be widened to six lanes.  The Turnpike Authority began work on 
the project at the southern end in 1971.  
But this was a new era.  The Legislature had enacted several major pieces of environmental 
legislation that required much more detailed review of the impacts of a project than were 
required when the turnpike was originally built.  The Turnpike Authority took the position that as 
a state agency, it was exempt from these reviews.  The newly formed Department of  
Environmental Protection sought an advisory opinion from the attorney general whether this was 
so, and the attorney general concluded that the Turnpike Authority was not exempt.  
Construction on the widening project continued while the case was litigated in the Maine courts 
until 1974, when the Maine Supreme Judicial Court not only upheld the attorney general's 
opinion that the Turnpike Authority was subject to state environmental laws, but also concluded 
that the original grant of Authority to build the turnpike did not include authorization for a six-
lane road.  
The Turnpike Authority completed the widening then underway, halting at mile 12.  By this 
time, the energy crisis was driving up the cost of construction and slowing traffic growth.  
Widening was put on hold through the next decade with its two energy crises and two major 
recessions.  As the economy began to recover in the wake of the 1981-82 recession, traffic 
growth resumed and the Turnpike Authority began looking again at the widening issue.  In 1984 
it authorized new studies of future capital needs.  The firm of Howard Needles Tammen & 
Bergendoff (HNTB), which provides engineering services to the Turnpike Authority, reported in 
September 1986.1  The HNTB analysis focused on traffic growth and the adequacy of future 
turnpike revenues.  It found that a combination of planned interchange additions plus growing 
traffic on the southern part of the turnpike meant congestion would increase steadily and that the 
widening project provided the best approach to dealing with traffic growth.  The 
recommendation included completing the widening project plus completing the groundwork 
(acquisition plus grading) necessary to add a fourth lane in each direction at some time in the 
future. 
The HNTB study encouraged the Turnpike Authority to proceed with plans to widen the 
turnpike.  In 1987, the Legislature acted to provide the necessary legal and bonding Authority for 
the widening project.  But the analysis and forecasts on which the recommendation was based 
appeared weak to a number of people who reviewed it.  Lloyd Irland, a former state economist, 
began to raise serious questions about the adequacy of the review of nonconstruction alternatives 
that might be more effective in managing the peak-hour traffic congestion.  Upon leaving state 
government in late 1986, Irland began working with a newly formed public policy research 
organization called the Mainewatch Institute to develop an alternative analysis to the HNTB 
study.  
That report,2 released in January 1988, questioned the widening on the grounds that traffic 
congestion could be better managed using techniques such as peak-hour pricing, ramp metering, 
and better information programs about traffic at a lower cost than widening.  Mainewatch also 
argued that the economic costs had not been justified by comparison with economic benefits, that 
toll funding of the widening was inequitable, that environmental impacts had not been examined, 
and that alternative uses for the toll revenues to build other projects had not been examined.  It 
concluded that a serious examination of alternatives to widening must be undertaken before the 
project could proceed.  
Even before the release of the Mainewatch report, the Turnpike Authority had initiated a second 
look at the widening issues.  The issues being raised by Mainewatch were receiving increased 
attention in the press,3 and even Authority members were having doubts. One member, Peter 
Danton, a former state senator from Saco, was concerned about the toll increase needed for the 
project and expressed the fear that if tolls were raised there would be increased traffic on local 
streets in Saco.  In late 1987, the Authority decided to delay the first toll increase needed for the 
widening, and engaged the firms of Roger Mallar Associates and Governmental Services Inc. 
(M-GSI) to take another look at the widening project.  Their report was released six months after 
the Mainewatch report,4 and directly addressed many of the issues raised by Mainewatch. 
However, it concluded that the alternatives to widening would not be sufficiently effective in 
relieving traffic.  Widening continued to be the recommended alternative, although the M-GSI 
report recommended a somewhat scaled-back construction project that did not include adding the 
groundwork for the fourth lane.   
By 1989, the Turnpike Authority had completed two separate studies on widening that both 
recommended proceeding with the project, and had received permission from the Legislature to 
proceed.  But opposition to the idea was growing.  Environmental groups, led by the Natural 
Resources Council of Maine (NRCM), were increasingly vocal on the need to investigate 
alternatives to widening before proceeding.  NRCM, Mainewatch, and others began to put 
together a proposal to require such investigations before proceeding with the turnpike widening,  
or any other major highway improvement.  Dubbed the "Sensible Transportation Policy Act, a 
signature-gathering campaign was undertaken in 1990, and the Legislature took up the bill in 
1991 and passed it on for the voters to consider that November.  
The prevailing wisdom was that the turnpike referendum had little chance of passing.  The Maine 
economy had descended into a severe recession, and concern about the economy was wide-
spread. The idea that the public would reject a major project that the entire business community, 
the governor, and majority of the Legislature declared as essential to the states economic future 
was considered unlikely.  But that is exactly what happened.  There were several reasons why the 
referendum passed. Voters in northern Maine overwhelmingly voted against the widening, 
believing the project was just one more example of the advantages southern Maine gets and 
fearful that their road needs would be neglected.  Statewide, there was widespread distrust - 
bordering on hostility - to state government and its leaders because of the severe budget cuts 
forced by the recession.  
Passage of the referendum enacted the Sensible Transportation Policy Act, which affected 
virtually every major transportation improvement in the state.  Because of the complexity of the 
issues involved, the Department of Transportation undertook a nearly yearlong process in 1992 
of developing and implementing regulations under the new act by bringing together many people 
involved in transportation issues, including antagonists in the 1991 referendum debate.  Once 
this process was completed, the Turnpike Authority again turned to the question of what to do 
about the road.  
The Authority believed it was now legally obligated to undertake actual trials of as many of the 
suggested alternative transportation strategies as possible.  In 1993 and 1994, the Authority 
initiated or expanded several projects designed to test whether the alternatives would be 
sufficient to manage traffic.  These included expanded park-and-ride lots, funding for a 
commuter bus service from York County to Portland, a commitment to implement an electronic 
toll collection system, and a decision to undertake a two-year experiment of congestion pricing.  
The proposal to implement congestion pricing on an experimental basis became a new point of 
controversy.  The study approved by the Authority called for a five-week period in August 1995 
when tolls would be raised during peak hours on weekends by two dollars per trip.  At the same 
time, tolls would be reduced during off-peak hours using a discount coupon system that would 
permit toll reductions of seventy-five cents per trip (or free trips if the normal toll was less than 
seventy-five cents). The proposal also would have imposed a one-dollar surcharge on commuter 
pass holders if they traveled alone on Friday afternoon.5  
The tourism industry mobilized against charting a higher toll on weekends, persuading the 
governor and Legislature to permanently ban the idea of peak-hour tolls and to prohibit any toll 
differentials on single-occupancy vehicles.  The legislation also provided that the turnpike could 
meet the requirements of the Sensible Transportation Policy Act through a modeling analysis 
rather than by implementing any form of congestion pricing.  The Turnpike Authority, however, 
directed that the study be redesigned to test the effects of free tolls during off-peak hours during 
1995 and again in 1996, and this redesigned study was undertaken.  
In 1996, the Authority again turned to a comprehensive assessment of the turnpike.  Rather than 
relying solely on a consultant study this time, the Authority convened a Public Advisory 
Committee (PAC) to investigate the options and make recommendations.  The PAC was 
comprised of representatives from the business and environmental communities, the Legislature, 
the Regional Transportation Advisory Committees (RTACs) established by the Sensible 
Transportation Policy Act, and communities from throughout Maine.  With the assistance of a 
consultant hired to review and analyze data for the committee, the PAC provided advice on the 
scope of the new analysis and worked with the consultant hired to assist in the process.  The 
PAC also was charged with providing recommendations to the Authority how to proceed once 
the evaluation of alternatives was completed.   
In the fall of 1996, the PAC completed its recommendation to the Authority.  A "preponderance" 
of the committee concluded that the Turnpike Authority should proceed with both the widening 
and further support of alternatives such as commuter buses and the reintroduction of passenger 
rail service south of Portland. Some members of the PAC, notably environmental group 
representatives, remained adamant that the case for widening had not been made and indicated 
they would not support any recommendation that included the widening project.   
The Legislature took up the issue again during the 1997 session, again acting to authorize the 
widening project and the necessary bonding Authority.  Faced with opponents' promises to 
launch another petition drive for a referendum, the Turnpike Authority itself called for a 
referendum to be held in the fall of 1997.  At the same time, the Legislature also unanimously 
rejected a bill that would have reinstated permission for the Authority to implement peak-hour 
tolls when the tourism industry renewed its objections about the perceived negative image that 
would be created. 
CONDITIONS ON THE TURNPIKE IN 1997 AND BEYOND 
The previous section provides a brief synopsis of the major events and elements in the turnpike 
widening debate up to the present.  It is apparent that even after a number of studies stretching 
over more than a decade there remains fundamental disagreement about many of the facts, let 
alone about what should be done with the turnpike. This section reviews trends in turnpike traffic 
and points out why the issue of traffic on the turnpike has been, and continues to be, a matter of 
concern. 
Figure 1 shows the growth in traffic on the Maine Turnpike (including all exits from York to 
Augusta).6 The figure depicts monthly traffic volumes from 1956 to 1996 (the period since the 
full 100 miles of the turnpike was completed) and the annual growth rates to show trends. The 
figure also places some of the major events from the history of the widening debate against the 
actual growth in traffic.  
Traffic growth clearly has occurred on the turnpike during the past forty years. Annual trips on 
the turnpike have grown from 3.8 million to more than 44 million, an overall rate of more than 
1,000 percent and an average annual growth rate of 6.4 percent, or about 1 million additional 
vehicles on average each year. Since the first effort to widen the turnpike in 1973 total traffic has 
grown by 256 percent, from 12 million to 44 million trips. Traffic on the turnpike varies  
significantly by month, with July or August being the peak month and January or February the 
slowest month. Another measure of traffic growth on the turnpike is that total January traffic in 
1996 equaled traffic during the peak month of travel in 1984 (August), just twelve years earlier.  
However, the rate of traffic growth has slowed somewhat. The average growth rate during the 
1960s was 7.7 percent; this slowed to 6.9 percent in the 1970s but accelerated again in the 1980s 
to an average of 8.5 percent. During the 1990s to date the average rate of growth has slowed to 3 
percent. However, a slowing rate of growth does not signify fewer trips. The average growth in 
trips during the 1990s at 3 percent is still more than 1 million additional trips per year, compared 
with the 1960s average growth rate of 7.7 percent, which represented only 440,000 additional 
trips per year.  
Concern about traffic on the turnpike arises partly because of increased traffic that comes with 
economic growth, but the primary issue is about peak-hour congestion during the highest-use 
months of the summer. Two questions about peak hours require examination. The first concerns 
summer traffic patterns; the second is how those patterns compare to the road's capacity.   
Figure 2, figure 3, and figure 4 show the summer traffic patterns on Fridays, Saturdays, and 
Sundays.7   The figures show the distribution of traffic across the twenty-four-hour period, using 
the proportion of each day's traffic in each hour. The data is the average of each day during the 
ten weeks from July through Labor Day in 1994, 1995, and 1996. (The turnpike's computer 
system only began tracking hourly data in 1994.) There are clear and consistent trends each day.  
On Fridays, there is a morning peak, followed by a slow down in traffic growth during the late 
morning. A new and larger peak begins to form around noon and continues to build throughout 
the afternoon, with the highest peak from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. It is notable that the Friday peak 
during the mid-to-late afternoon contradicts the conventional wisdom that the peak is driven by 
inbound tourists who leave work in southern New England at the end of the workday. On 
Saturdays and Sundays, there is no such peak. Rather, both days show a much broader "plateau" 
of traffic spread over a six- to eight-hour period. On Saturdays, there is somewhat more traffic in 
the morning, primarily southbound traffic reflecting the changeover in cottage and camp rentals 
on Saturdays. The peak becomes somewhat more northbound in the afternoon. On Sundays, the 
peak traffic is primarily southbound, beginning in the late morning and continuing throughout 
the afternoon and into the early evening.  
The composition of peak traffic changes over the three days of summer weekends. On Fridays, 
the morning peak is composed primarily of commuters, but the afternoon peak is a mix of 
commuter traffic plus inbound tourist traffic - there is very little commercial truck traffic during 
this period. On Saturdays and Sundays, commuter traffic declines significantly as a portion of 
total traffic (as measured by commuter pass use), and tourist-related traffic makes up almost all 
of the peak on both days. This is particularly the case on Sundays.  
The existence of distinct and consistent peak periods even extending over six to eight hours does 
not by itself demonstrate that peak congestion is a problem. To find this out requires comparing 
traffic loads with road capacity. Road capacity is not a single concept, however. Traffic 
engineers use three concepts to describe capacity: the physical capacity; the level of service; and 
the design hour. Physical capacity is determined by a number of factors, including width of the 
lanes and shoulders, the geometry of the road, and terrain. In general, a road with wide lanes and 
shoulders running in a straight line over level terrain will have a higher physical capacity than a 
road with narrow lanes and shoulders, sharp curves, and hilly terrain.  
The level-of-service concept describes a continuum of traffic conditions, from free-flowing 
traffic at the posted speed limit to highly congested, stop-and-go traffic. In most discussions of 
turnpike traffic, the relevant categories are LOS C through LOS F, defined as follows:  
LOS C. Stable traffic flows, but small events can slow traffic. Average speeds are greater than 
fifty-four mph. Noticeable restrictions on freedom to maneuver, with increased driver tension. 
This is the level of service the Public Advisory Committee established as the target service the 
turnpike should be able to offer; this is consistent with the practice of other roads similar to the 
turnpike.  
LOS D. Borderline between stable and unstable traffic flows; small increases in traffic cause 
significant deterioration in speed and freedom to maneuver. Average speeds greater than forty-
six mph.  
LOS E. Operation at capacity, with restricted speeds and no room to maneuver. Vehicles 
entering or changing lanes cause severe disruptions in traffic flow, which creates waves of slow-
downs that propagate through the traffic stream. Average speeds about thirty mph.  
LOS F. Forced or breakdown flow, with stop-and-go traffic. Entering traffic exceeds the number 
of vehicles traversing any given point.  
The design hour represents the target period for highway design. Highways are not designed to 
accommodate the highest possible volume, since that would result in overbuilding. Rather, an 
hour somewhat short of the highest possible traffic volume is chosen as the design hour. 
Generally this is the thirtiest-highest hour in a year; that is, traffic volumes for each hour of a 
year are estimated, and the volume during the thirtiest-highest hour is chosen as the level of 
traffic for which the road should be designed.  
Figure 5 and figure 6 bring these concepts together for the turnpike. They show the traffic 
volumes for 1995 and forecasts for 2005 and 2015 in the design hour for each segment of the 
turnpike from York to Exit 6A, where 1-95 and 1-295 diverge, and compare these traffic levels 
with the traffic volumes that would produce LOS C and LOS D travel for northbound traffic on 
Friday and southbound traffic on Sunday.8  
Traffic levels for the design hour in 1995 showed traffic that flowed at LOS D in all segments 
south of Exit 6A, in both northbound and southbound peaks. Forecast traffic for the design hour 
shows that service will deteriorate to LOS E in the segments between Biddeford and South 
Portland by 2005 and be very close to this level south of Biddeford. (Issues surrounding forecasts 
of future traffic are discussed below.) By 2015, traffic will exceed capacity and deteriorate to 
LOS F in all segments of the turnpike south of Exit 6A. However, once traffic divides at Exit 6A, 
traffic conditions will remain at L0S C or better through 2005 and only reach LOS C between 
2010 and 2015.   
A final, much-discussed issue with respect to the unwidened section south of Portland is safety. 
As traffic flow increase, the likelihood of accidents can increase as maneuver ability declines and 
proximity between vehicles increases. Two measures of safety describe recent trends on the 
turnpike. The first is the presence of High Accident Locations (HALs). These are road segments 
or locations at which the number of accidents exceeds both a set threshold and a statistically 
estimated level of expected accidents.  There are ten HALs on the turnpike, all of which are in 
the four-lane section south of Portland. Nine of the HALs are on the northbound lanes, and eight 
are on segments between Biddeford and Scarborough (the most heavily traveled section of the 
entire Turnpike).9 
 The twelve miles of the turnpike widened in the early 1970s provide a natural experiment to test 
the effects of six lanes versus four lanes on accident rates. Figure 7 and figure 8 compare the 
accident rate (accidents per hundred million vehicle miles) on the four-lane section with those on 
the six-lane section south of Mile 12 for two three-year periods, 1987-89 and 1993-95. 
Southbound, there is a decrease in the accident rate between the two periods, but the six-lane 
section shows lower accident rates during both periods and a larger decline than on the four-lane 
section. Northbound, which the number of HALs indicates is the more dangerous direction, there 
is a slight increase in the accident rate between the periods, but again the six-lane section shows 
significantly lower accident rates. When the records of individual accidents in the turnpike HALs 
are grouped by major causes, 46 percent of accidents can be clearly attributed to road geometry 
or congestion, the major problems in the four-lane section.10  
The current conditions of the turnpike can be summarized as follows:  
1. Traffic growth has been steady, except for brief periods during economic recessions. The total 
traffic volume is more than ten times higher than when the road was originally designed in the 
1940s. Traffic peaks during the summer months and particularly on weekends. The slowest 
months in the 1990s equal the peak months of less than fifteen years ago. Together, these trends 
constitute what might be described as the "base load" problem.  
2. Peak traffic occurs on summer weekends, with peak traffic spread over very long periods of up 
to seven hours. Current traffic levels in a design hour show a low level of service. Projected 
growth rates show that capacity will be reached in many segments by 2005 and in all segments 
between 2005 and 2015. This is the "peak load" problem.  
3. Accident data indicates the four-lane road is noticeably more prone to accidents than the six-
lane stretch. 
 
 
THE DEBATE OVER THE FUTURE OF THE TURNPIKE 
The debate over the turnpike now turns on a variety of arguments for and against widening and 
for and against the alternatives to widening. This section examines a number of the major 
arguments for and against widening. It also looks at the arguments for and against what is 
perhaps the most important alternative to widening: congestion pricing. One set of issues that 
will not be examined are the environmental impacts. Those important issues must await another 
analysis. 
IN FAVOR OF WIDENING 
The project is economically justified 
A threshold test for any public investment of this type is whether it meets basic tests of economic 
efficiency. This is measured by benefit-cost analysis, which compares the increased capital and 
operating costs of the project plus the increases in vehicle operating costs (which rise with 
increased speeds) to the benefits of time saved from reduced congestion, accidents, and diversion 
to less-efficient alternate routes. Figure 9 shows the results of the benefit-cost analysis conducted 
for the Public Advisory Committee. The benefit-cost analysis shows that benefits will exceed 
costs by more than $107 million in present value over twenty- five years at a 6 percent discount 
rate.11  The benefit-cost ratio is 1:6, showing that the widening project passes the basic test of an 
acceptable investment.  
Two criticisms can be leveled at this analysis, however. One is not valid, the other is valid. The 
invalid criticism is that the benefit-cost analysis should include the costs of increasing congestion 
on other roads from the increased traffic that would result from widening. In fact, there may be 
such costs, but they are properly considered in the benefit-cost analysis applied to projects to 
manage traffic on the other roads, not the turnpike. As pointed out below, the turnpike does need 
to be considered as part of broader transportation links. But there are a huge number of potential 
projects that could be undertaken to manage traffic throughout Maine (since the turnpike carries 
traffic from throughout Maine, virtually every road in the state potentially is subject to its 
influence). To try to include the benefits and costs of every potential traffic management project 
in order to determine the net effect across the whole system would be an impossible and, 
ultimately, meaningless task.  
The valid criticism concerns the environmental costs and mitigation strategies that will be 
required to meet them. Two major environmental costs would be incurred from widening the 
turnpike. One is increased air pollution. However, since southern Maine is already a moderate 
nonattainment area under the Clean Air Act, the turnpike widening will have to be shown to have 
no net increase in air pollution to secure the necessary permits from the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). There will be costs to any strategies undertaken to meet this condition, 
and they should be included on the cost side of the benefit-cost ledger. The other environmental 
cost is the loss of some twenty-three acres of wetlands. This loss has an economic value, 
although estimating that value is very difficult.12  Again, there will be mitigation strategies 
required whose costs must be included. The net environmental costs cannot, however, be 
estimated with any confidence until it is clear what actions will be required by state and federal 
agencies to deal with the costs. For this reason, the benefit-cost analysis should be redone after it  
becomes clear what will be required to comply with environmental standards to ensure the 
environmental costs do not exceed the $107 million in net present value benefits currently 
estimated to exist.  
The turnpike is the major road in and out of Maine and thus is essential to the economy.  
In order to assess the economic impact of the turnpike, an analysis was done for the Public 
Advisory Committee comparing future growth in the Maine economy if the turnpike is widened 
and if it is not. The analysis was done using the econometric models of Maine developed by 
Regional Economic Models Inc. (REMI), one of the most widely used regional economic 
models.13  The base forecast of the REMI model assumes growth will not be constrained by 
major restrictions on key infrastructure like the turnpike. In order to assess the impacts of 
widening, an alternate forecast was prepared that modeled what would happen if the turnpike 
was not widened. The analysis uses a scenario of an unwidened turnpike because the model uses 
an assumption of growth unconstrained by infrastructure capacity. Thus, compared with a 
baseline unconstrained forecast, an unwidened turnpike would be characterized by reduced 
efficiency and higher costs in the trucking industry and reduced tourism expenditures from 
travelers who avoid coming to Maine because of the congestion.  
The analysis for the PAC shows that a turnpike that reached its capacity between 2005 and 2015 
would be accompanied by a reduction of 11,000 jobs in Maine (6,000 in York and Cumberland 
counties), resulting in a decline of $211.6 million in real disposable personal income and $456 
million in gross state product. These figures may be about 25 percent high because of the 
inclusion of lost hotel expenditures in the tourist-industry effects (those coming for extended 
stays are less likely to be dissuaded by congestion than those coming on day trips), but it is clear 
the turnpike plays a significant role in determining the overall prospects for the Maine economy.  
Alternatives have not proved to be sufficient to reduce congestion.  
Under the Sensible Transportation Policy Act, the Turnpike Authority has undertaken 
implementing a number of the alternatives. These experiments have shown that design-hour 
traffic in 2005 could be reduced by the amounts shown in Table 1.14 
Table 1: Reduction in Design Hour Traffic 
(number of vehicles) 
Low  High 
Commuter Bus Service 5 89 
Commuter Rail Service 7 122 
Intercity Rail Service 21 39 
Freight diversion 20 20 
Congestion pricing15 68 81 
TOTAL 121 351 
These reductions compare with 1995 traffic levels that average 2,400 vehicles in the design-hour 
northbound (Fridays) and 2,600 southbound (Sundays), and estimated 2005 levels of 3,200 
northbound and 3,400 southbound on the same days. 
OPPOSED TO WIDENING 
Traffic forecasts are too high; the problem is not as serious as it is made out to be 
Both actual and forecast traffic growth rates on the turnpike have declined significantly since the 
mid-1980s when the HNTB report first recommended widening. The HNTB forecast a rate of 
traffic growth of nearly 9 percent per year. The subsequent Mallar-Governmental Services Inc. 
report lowered the projected traffic growth rate to 6 percent, which at the time was lower than 
what was actually being experienced on the turnpike but in line with long-term growth trends 
over the previous thirty years.  
Neither the HNTB nor Mallar-GSI reports developed statistically based estimates derived from a 
forecast of the Maine economy. For the 1996 PAC process, VHB prepared a forecast of traffic 
growth based on the University of Southern Maine Center for Business and Economic Research 
long-term economic forecasts. These forecasts were prepared by the author for Economic 
Development Districts in Maine and for each of the Regional Transportation Advisory 
Committee regions established under the Sensible Transportation Policy Act in order to provide 
a consistent forecast for transportation planning across all areas of the state. The resulting 
forecast produced a growth rate in turnpike traffic of 2.93 percent, which was reduced further for 
the estimation of future trends to 2.75 percent. This is the growth rate underlying the projections 
of future capacity constraints as well as the benefit-cost and economic impact analyses.  
But, it is argued, these figures are still too high. They forecast growth in total annual traffic (base 
load rather than peak load, which grows more slowly). There are two responses to this argument. 
The first, illustrated in Figure 10, is to assume the growth rate of the peak is only half that of the 
base (1.37 percent versus 2.75 percent). Under the 2.75 percent assumption, traffic reaches LOS 
E in about four years and LOS F in another four years. Cutting the rate of growth in half extends 
the period it takes to get to LOS F to around 2013, but leaves the turnpike at LOS E from 2006 
until then. Costs, in the form of traffic delays, will continue to grow each year. Since it will take 
about eight years of permitting and construction to complete the widening (meaning it would not 
be completed until 2006), delaying the widening does not solve the congestion problem, it only 
extends the time period at which summer traffic endures LOS E (speeds under thirty mph with 
frequent delays) before it becomes completely stop-and-go (LOS F).  
In a real sense, however, this argument about peak growth rates misses the point. Traffic growth 
on the turnpike has slowed from historic levels of around 6 percent to around 4 percent because 
of the congestion problem.16 In other words, the argument that traffic growth is slowing is a 
measure of the problem, not the solution. Carried to its logical extreme, the "high growth rate" 
argument implies that if the turnpike was at full capacity with stop-and-go travel year-round and 
thus experiencing a zero growth rate, it should not be widened at all.  
 
Much was made in the debate leading up to the 1991 referendum focused on the argument that 
traffic congestion only occurs on the turnpike for ten days a year and for a total of perhaps sixty 
hours. If the problem is this small, why spend all that money to fix it? It has become clear, 
however, that the congestion problem is significantly more widespread. The 1995-96 congestion-
pricing study found consistent levels of peak-hour traffic congestion over ten weekends plus 
holidays (thirty-four days, including Labor Day and the Fourth of July), Congestion is also a 
problem on Memorial Day and Columbus Day weekends, with periodic problems on other 
weekends in June and September depending on weather. This increases the time when 
congestion is currently a problem to more than forty days per year.  
Using the projected growth rates discussed above, VHB estimates that the number of hours 
below the target Level of Service C will be as shown in Table 2.17 
Table 2: Hours Worse than LOS C 
SOUTHBOUND NORTHBOUND 
2005 2015 2005 2015 
 
LOS D 520 435 747 550 
LOS E 200 227 413 247 
LOS F 111 175 557 686 
TOTAL 831 837 1,717 1,483 
Traffic Congestion is a natural phenomenon.  People choose to drive during congested 
periods, so why fix it? 
The Mainewatch study points out that "virtually all of those inconvenienced by congestion are 
aware of the congestion periods in advance, yet voluntarily choose to become ensnarled in 
them." Thus, if people choose to drive when the road is congested, that is their problem, not one 
that requires major construction to solve.  
The response to this argument is usually that people do not always have the option of when they 
drive, as is the case with commuters. This is partly true, but insufficient. There is some evidence 
of ability to shift time of travel, as indicated by the shifting of the peak on Friday afternoons to 
earlier periods. The real problem with this argument is that it ignores fundamental conditions of 
economic efficiency. To see this, imagine that the Maine Turnpike was owned by a private 
company. Such a company would have an effective monopoly over high-speed highway travel in 
the corridor, and as such would act (in the absence of government regulation) to maximize its 
profit by overpricing and under producing its services. That is, the turnpike would have high tolls 
and there would be no incentive to spend money to improve service on the road. Why bother 
spending money to relieve congestion when consumers had no choice but to drive on the road?  
This situation clearly would not be tolerated for very long if the turnpike was, in fact, a private 
monopoly. That is the reason it is owned by a public Authority, which manages the turnpike 
under a public service obligation. Rather than the profit-maximizing rule of the monopolist that 
leads to poor service, the service obligation of a public Authority means economic investments 
that will improve services should be undertaken. As long as economically justified investments 
are not undertaken, there is a significant loss in economic welfare (measured by the benefits 
discussed above). In other words, though people may choose to drive on a congested highway, 
there is still an economic loss from congestion that should be addressed. Forcing the Turnpike 
Authority to behave like a monopolist will not result in an economic improvement.  
Alternatives to widening have not been explored sufficiently. 
Of the alternatives to widening that have been examined, the one that has been examined least 
and that has the most potential for managing traffic is congestion pricing. The reason is that the 
Legislature prohibited the Turnpike Authority from raising tolls during peak hours before the 
experiment could be conducted in 1995. What has been tested is off-peak discounted tolls, which 
allowed coupon holders (1995) and frequent turnpike travelers (1996) to travel free during the 
periods before and after the peaks on summer weekends. These experiments showed that this 
was insufficient incentive to alleviate congestion.18 
Would congestion pricing involving peak-hour tolls be more successful as a traffic management 
device? There is no doubt that peak-hour surcharges on tolls would be more effective in reducing 
peak-hour traffic than off-peak discounts or even free travel would be by itself. But the final 
report of the congestion-pricing study concluded that even peak-hour tolls would not likely be an 
effective management device given the current turnpike configuration. With no real alternate 
routes, congestion pricing can only provide incentives to shift the time of travel. With peak-hour 
periods already extending over six to seven hours, the available time into which travel could be 
shifted even with peak tolls is limited. Moreover, analysis of the responses to the discount tolls 
showed that travelers were much more likely to shift the time of their travel on Sundays than on 
Fridays. Peak tolls would alleviate some of the congestion on Sundays and perhaps on Saturdays, 
but Fridays would remain a very difficult problem. These problems will only increase as base-
load traffic growth continues.  
Beyond this, the fact remains that peak-hour tolls are illegal under current law, a fact reaffirmed 
by the Legislature in 1997 when it unanimously refused to lift the ban on peak-hour tolls. As 
argued below, peak-hour tolls can be, and should be, an essential part of effective traffic 
management on the turnpike. But until the Legislature can be convinced of this, peak tolls are not 
on the menu.  
The other alternative that might have an impact is passenger rail, which still has not been 
implemented and may yet be some years away. Passenger rail may play a large role in 
transportation within the southern Maine corridor, but its competitiveness against auto traffic 
remains doubtful. Current plans for a low-speed rail line would provide for a Portland-Boston 
trip of one and a half to two hours, which is only a slight improvement over the auto travel time. 
Passenger rail is also designed to capture trips that currently are unaccommodated for by auto 
travel, and thus would not necessarily draw traffic off the turnpike.  
 
 
The turnpike should not be widened because it will make traffic worse on already crowded 
secondary roads. 
The implication of this argument is that the solution to highway problems in Maine is to limit the 
volume of vehicles in the state to that which can be carried on a four-lane turnpike. However, 
increasing congestion on the turnpike does not solve the problem of secondary road traffic, since 
congested traffic still ultimately will be released onto secondary roads. It is certainly the case that 
additional work will be required to improve service on highways throughout the state, but 
arguing that the turnpike's problems should not be addressed until all the other roads are 
addressed is a classic example of "making the best the enemy of the better." Fortunately, the 
Sensible Transportation Policy Act envisioned a process that assured major transportation 
investments would be considered in the context of regional transportation needs. The 
implementing regulations established eight regional Transportation Advisory Committees to 
work with the Department of Transportation in order to assure that coordination between state 
and local plans takes place. 
Money to pay for widening should be used on other road projects. 
With more than 8,000 miles of highway, and real needs for improvements to highways and 
bridges throughout the state, it is certainly tempting to look to turnpike tolls in order to pay for 
these improvements rather than raising gas taxes. There is little doubt that the defeat of the 
widening in the 1991 referendum was tied in part to the view that turnpike money should be 
spent elsewhere. But there are legal and economic difficulties with such an approach.  
It may be noted that in 1995 the Legislature authorized the Department of Transportation to 
borrow the next ten years of funds that were to be received from the turnpike to fund the 
completion of three bridge projects (the Casco Bay bridge, the Brunswick-Topsham bypass, and 
the third Waterville-Winslow bridge) when Highway Fund revenues from the gas tax proved 
inadequate. This would appear to be a precedent for diversion of future funds to other non-
turnpike projects. However, this is very unlikely. The diversion of revenues to the bridge projects 
incorporated funds that already were being used by the Department of Transportation. New bond 
issues to be backed by toll revenues would run headlong into the bond covenant problem. They 
either would be restricted to use on the turnpike or the bonds would have to be charged as 
general obligation bonds.  
Moreover, there is good reason to doubt that any large-scale transfer of revenues from the 
turnpike to other highway projects is justified. First, turnpike toll revenues are legally dedicated 
to the construction and maintenance of the turnpike. When the turnpike legislation was written in 
1941, the road was established as a toll road with a separate Authority established to build and 
maintain the road. By establishing a separate legal entity with its own funding source, tolls, the 
state could build the road without any legal obligations to the Highway Fund or General Fund. 
The Turnpike Authority borrowed money using bonds backed by the pledge that toll revenues 
would be used to repay the bonds and maintain the highway. The Turnpike Authority does 
provide a fixed amount of its revenue to the Department of Transportation each year for projects 
related to other transportation improvements in the turnpike corridor,19 but as long as the 
Turnpike Authority has outstanding revenue bonds that contain this pledge, it will not be 
possible to divert significant funds to other projects.  
There is also good reason to doubt that even a larger diversion of turnpike revenues to other 
highway projects would not be good policy. It is certainly not clear that equity would be served 
by having turnpike travelers have the tolls they pay diverted to projects in northern Maine while 
they continue to sit in traffic on an increasingly congested highway. Indeed, it would be hard to 
justify the diversion of turnpike tolls to other projects on equity grounds under any 
circumstances.  
Moreover, it is not clear that even if the turnpike revenues could be diverted to other highway 
projects that widening would necessarily take second place to any other project. In any ranking 
of projects on benefit-cost grounds, the important variables driving the outcomes would be the 
number of travelers affected and the value of transportation-time improvements. If projects were 
analyzed and rank ordered on a net benefits basis, the turnpike widening would certainly rank 
very high, if not at the top of the list simply because of the volume of traffic affected by the 
project. There might be projects elsewhere with critical safety needs, but the only justification for 
using turnpike revenues for such a project, rather than drawing on other projects from the 
Highway Fund or raising the gasoline tax, would be to avoid potential political difficulties.  
Another side of this argument is the question of whether or not the original vision of the turnpike 
as a road extending all the way to Fort Kent should be completed. The turnpike legislation was 
enacted more than a decade before the federal government undertook responsibility for building 
the interstate highway system, which eventually led to the extension of a limited-access highway 
from Augusta to Houlton. The idea of extending the limited-access highway north from Houlton 
to Madawaska or from Bangor to Calais continues to be much discussed, but the problem 
remains how to pay for it. Neither state nor federal road-building budgets could currently support 
it, and there is no evidence that traffic volumes would be high enough to pay for the road through 
tolls. Constraints on the expansion of a limited-access highway in northern Maine are not to be 
found in the resolution of the question of widening thirty miles in York and Cumberland 
counties.  
We are already subsidizing congestion with the commuter pass system. 
The commuter pass allows those who frequently travel on the turnpike to purchase the right to 
unlimited travel between any two exits during a three-month period for a flat fee. By law; the fee 
must be priced at 50 percent of the regular toll for two daily trips on weekdays during the three-
month period. It may be argued that this is a form of congestion pricing in that it provides 
additional incentive to drive during peak hours on weekdays. There is undoubtedly some truth in 
this, although the reality of congestion on the turnpike is more complex. The peak hours that 
approach capacity are on summer weekends when, as indicated above, only on Fridays are 
commuters a significant portion of traffic volumes. Commuters account for only 5 to 10 percent 
of summer weekend traffic.  
Moreover, it is not commuter traffic per se that is the major problem with congestion. As a 
number of studies have shown, it is single-occupancy vehicles (SOVs) that create the greatest 
problems during rush hours.20  It was for this reason the congestion-pricing study proposed a 
cash surcharge on Friday afternoons on commuter pass holders in SOVs in an effort to provide 
an incentive not to change time of travel, which is very difficult with commuters, but to change 
the mode. However, this surcharge was outlawed along with all other peak-hour pricing. The 
problem of SOV commuters is one the Turnpike Authority will need to address, but the problems 
of summer weekend congestion that are driving traffic toward capacity on the current roadway 
would not be solved by addressing this issue alone.  
The widening will only solve the congestion problem temporarily; congestion will reur and 
then we will have to add a forth lane, etc. 
The projections of traffic growth at 2.75 percent show the need for widening as early as 2005 if 
LOS E or worse levels of congestion are to be avoided. These projections indicate that widening 
will result in achieving the target level of service LOS C between 2005 and 2015, but by 2015 
continued growth in traffic at 2.75 percent will return traffic levels even on the widened roadway 
to the current LOS D. However, the widened road almost certainly will result in a faster rate of 
growth than the 2.75 percent, causing peak congestion reform within less than a decade. 
This phenomenon of new or improved roads experiencing renewed congestion soon after the 
improvement project is finished is explained by what is known as the Downs triple 
convergence,21 which is named for the economist who described it. When a road is built or 
improved to alleviate congestion, traffic does not simply grow at previous rates, but at faster 
rates because traffic is diverted onto the new road from three sources: those who had traveled at 
later or earlier times to avoid congestion those who had diverted to alternate routes to avoid 
congestion and those who had switched to public transportation. Of these the latter would have 
little effect on the turnpike, but the former two sources clearly would be a source of additional 
traffic. The traffic data clearly shows diversion in time, as evidenced by the very wide peaks of 
summer weekend traffic.  
Downs points out that the only approach that avoids the triple convergence and the continuation 
of congestion is to apply congestion pricing. However, it already has been pointed out that 
congestion pricing under current law is not very effective and that effective congestion pricing is 
not legal. In addition, the already wide peaks and low responsiveness to price on some days 
make congestion pricing alone an inadequate response to current and projected congestion levels. 
If the roadway were to be widened, congestion would be temporarily relieved. People who have 
shifted their time of travel (which does occur on all three days) in order to avoid congestion will 
revert to their preferred time of travel, causing peaks to reform. It is at this point that peak tolls 
could spread the peaks over a longer time period (and a wider road).  
The analysis thus indicates that widening the turnpike is a necessary but not sufficient response 
to the congestion problem. Congestion pricing has potential to alleviate future congestion on a 
widened road but not current levels. Only the combination of the two might provide a more 
stable long-term solution to traffic congestion on the turnpike. If this is the case, however, Maine 
finds itself in the curious position in which both of the necessary components of a solution to the 
turnpike traffic problem have been adamantly and successfully opposed by one group or another 
and effectively outlawed. Therefore, in order to complete this assessment, it is necessary to 
examine the arguments about peak-hour pricing. This can be done most easily by considering the 
arguments against peak-hour pricing.  
 
Peak tolls won't work and will destroy the tourist industry. 
The 1988 Mallar-Govemmental Services Inc. study rejected peak-hour tolls as unlikely to be 
effective, and this has been a common view. The argument is that the turnpike traffic is 
predominantly made up of people who have little flexibility in their time of travel or would be 
insensitive to a peak toll in the overall context of what is spent on vacation.22 At the same time, 
there was immense concern in the tourist industry that any peak-hour toll would be seen by 
tourists as an insult and would simply drive people away from Maine. These twin impulses 
clearly are contradictory;  peak-hour tolls cannot be simultaneously so small as to be ineffective 
and so large as to discourage tourists from coming. Yet these are the arguments that were made, 
as the following excerpt from the legislative debate on the bill outlawing peak tolls indicates:  
"People come to Wells and to southern Maine. They pay $500 to $1,000 to rent a place for the 
week. They aren't going to change their plans when they arrive because of a $2 charge by the 
Maine Turnpike at certain times of the day. If they do know about it and if they wish to avoid the 
$2 surcharge, guess where they will go? They go up Route 1. I can tell you that Route 1 does not 
need that traffic. If people know about the $2 surcharge they may not come at all, but if they do 
not know about the surcharge and they come up to the toll booth, they are hit right in the face 
with a charge that seems to them truly exorbitant."23  
Despite the self-contradiction in these arguments, the congestion-pricing study collected 
evidence on both. With respect to the question of whether people would respond to the monetary 
incentives at all, the off-peak free travel offered during 1995 and 1996 was accompanied by 
statistically significant increases in the off-peak-hour traffic on Sundays and, to a limited extent, 
on Saturdays. The experience on Fridays was much more mixed, with some evidence in the 1995 
study of effects in the morning but no evidence of shifting traffic toward the off-peak hours in 
the afternoon in either year. At the same time, what shifts there were toward off-peak hours were 
not sufficient to reduce peak traffic volumes, largely because of the volume of traffic and length 
of the peak period.  
Thus, the argument that people will not change their time of travel to respond to price incentives 
is not accurate as a generalization. People do respond to price incentives on the Maine Turnpike, 
just as they do when they choose to make long-distance calls in the evening or attend a low-price 
matinee movie. But it is also the case that the results from the congestion-pricing experiment are 
consistent with the observation that the flexibility to change times is an important factor, at least 
on weekdays.  
When the Maine Legislature outlawed peak-hour tolls in June, 1995, the proposal before it was 
to raise tolls by $2 on Friday and Sunday peak hours over a total of thirty-three hours on eleven 
days. The peak tolls were to be accompanied by more than 300 hours of off-peak discount tolls. 
Yet this rather modest effort to test peak tolls provoked outrage in the tourism industry. The bill 
that the Legislature passed not only forbade peak-toll experiments, it forbade peak tolls 
permanently and stated that congestion pricing would not have to be actually tried in order to 
fulfill the requirements of the Sensible Transportation Policy Act. It has been the case that 
congestion pricing has not been politically popular anywhere it has been proposed. Despite  
federal funding to experiment with congestion pricing as part of the Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), peak-hour tolls have been imposed on no public road in 
the United States.24 
Testing whether the public's response to the idea of peak-hour tolls would be as negative as was 
suggested was part of a survey conducted of turnpike travelers on the fourth weekend of August 
1995. This was a survey handed out to travelers at toll plazas selected to capture the majority of 
the incoming and outgoing tourist traffic. Two questions were asked concerning congestion 
pricing. The first posited that discounted tolls might be continued in the future and asked about 
the preferred method for raising revenue to offset the losses that would occur. Peak-hour tolls 
were selected by a plurality of respondents from among five choices. Peak-hour tolls were 
preferred more by residents of Massachusetts and New Hampshire than those from Maine.  
The second question presented a set of hypothetical peak-hour surcharges from fifty cents to 
three dollars and asked whether such surcharges would encourage the traveler to shift the time of 
travel, the route of travel, discourage them from  making the trip, or would have no effect. Figure 
11 shows the answers to this question. The responses are very much in line with what would be 
expected; as the peak surcharge increases, there is less willingness to continue the trip as before 
and greater willingness to switch either route or time. However, at suggested peak surcharges up 
to three dollars, there is no significant expressed willingness to discontinue the trip altogether.  
Survey research of this type is not necessarily a reliable guide to actual behavior (remember 
"new Coke"), but the idea of peak tolls was received with much less hostility and much more 
understanding than would have been suspected given the swiftness and finality with which the 
Legislature acted to dispose of the idea.  
Peak tolls are inadequate. 
Another common argument against peak tolls in Maine and elsewhere is that they are inequitable 
because they force people who cannot change the time of their travel or their route.  There is also 
a sense that the road is already being paid for (through tolls or fuel taxes), so why should one 
have to pay extra? It is the case that if alternatives are available, they generally are used, at least 
up to the point at which principal routes and alternates are both congested. So in many situations, 
congestion pricing does try to encourage people to use alternatives that often are not there.  
Economists who have developed the theory of congestion pricing have pointed out that when a 
road becomes crowded, each additional vehicle creates congestion delays not only for itself but 
for all the vehicles around it. Since space is at premium in such situations, it should command a 
higher price. Thus, there is no inherent inequity in asking people to pay additional amounts when 
space is at a premium and each additional vehicle diminishes the space available for everyone.25 
Still, it is clear that the perceived inequity outweighs the theoretical equity and plays a role in 
preventing congestion pricing from being implemented.  
For this reason, it has been argued that the key to making congestion pricing work is to provide a 
clear-cut benefit in exchange for the peak-hour toll, and that this benefit must go beyond the 
reduced congestion that would result.26 This was confirmed by the Maine Turnpike survey 
results cited earlier; peak-hour surcharges were the most frequently chosen option because the 
question asked about the benefit of discount tolls rather than simply asking, "Should we use 
higher tolls to control congestion?" The idea that peak tolls must be tied to clear benefits to gain 
public support means that the only way congestion pricing might be implemented on the Maine 
Turnpike is in conjunction with widening.  
If peak tolls were used to pay for at least a substantial portion of the widening costs, equity 
actually would be enhanced, since those who would get the most benefit from the widening 
would pay the greater share of the costs. Those who would get less benefit, such as travelers in 
the winter months or during the overnight hours, would not have to pay for a benefit (less 
congestion) they were not receiving.27 
CONCLUSIONS: THE ROAD AHEAD  
The proposal to widen the turnpike in the late 1980s may have been justified on economic 
grounds at the time. But the evidence to support it was weak, and the 1991 referendum and 
passage of the Sensible Transportation Policy Act requiring a thorough evaluation of alternatives 
prior to a decision have clearly improved our understanding of the turnpike, transportation 
options, the consequences of the choices available to Maine, and thus the confidence with which 
decisions can be made. The conclusions the evidence supports are the following:  
1. The Turnpike Authority should proceed with plans to widen the four-lane stretch of the 
Turnpike from mile 12 to mile 42 (Exit 6A) to six lanes. This means moving to the next 
stage of seeking the required permits from state and federal agencies - at this time 
environmental-impact issues, including wetland losses, and air-quality impacts will have 
to be addressed. If these can be satisfactorily addressed, the project should proceed.  
2. The Legislature should authorize the Turnpike Authority to use peak-hour tolls. The 
Authority should develop a plan to integrate peak tolls and off-peak discounts to pay for 
the widening and manage traffic on the improved road. (Other alternatives for passenger 
transportation in the southern corridor also should be pursued, including passenger rail to 
Boston and efforts to reduce single-occupancy vehicles on the Turnpike and other roads.)  
Only this combination of actions will address both the base- and peak-load problems now and in 
the future. Yet this has been specifically rejected by both sides in the turnpike debate. 
Environmental groups have been adamant that widening is not needed and that congestion 
pricing will solve the problem (perhaps in combination with rail service). Business groups 
supporting a wider turnpike, particularly the trucking and tourist industries, have been just as 
adamant that peak tolls not be used. Despite the evidence presented about public reaction to the 
idea of peak tolls on the turnpike, tourist representatives turned out in force to oppose a bill 
during the 1997 legislative session that would have granted the Turnpike Authority permission to 
use peak tolls.28 The trucking industry joined them in opposition, despite the fact that most 
truckers do not drive during peak hours on summer weekends but would have to pay higher tolls 
year-round if peak tolls are not used.  
So after several years of studies and actual implementation of alternatives to widening totaling 
tens of millions of dollars, it does not appear the debate has progressed any distance at all from 
1991, or 1988, or 1974, for that matter. It is probably impossible to understand all the reasons the 
turnpike should continue to be such a flashpoint of controversy, but it does seem that more is in 
play here than the simple question of whether thirty miles of a road ought to be six lanes or four. 
The turnpike-widening debate has been less about technical questions of load forecasts or the 
finer points of demand theory, but about a clash of values about the way life should be in Maine.  
On one side are the opponents of widening, who see it as part of an inevitable deterioration of 
Maine's quality of life, caused largely by the automobile. Increasing auto traffic brings with it 
deteriorating air quality, more traffic on local roads, more suburban sprawl, and a loss of the 
open space and wildlife habitat many see as the most valuable part of Maine. Widening the 
turnpike will simply allow more of this destructive process to occur.  
On the other side are the proponents of widening, who see economic growth as essential to the 
quality of life and who see government's responsibility to provide the infrastructure to make that 
possible. Widening is essential to this process, and any attempt to impose the costs of that project 
on those most directly affected would be a signal that Maine's public is unfriendly to growth.  
Because it is a clash of values rather than a clash over the facts, the fight over the turnpike is 
likely to continue, whatever the outcome of the referendum in the fall of 1997. If approval for 
widening is given, opponents can be expected to continue to wage the battle before regulatory 
agencies and in the courts during the permitting process. If approval is refused, traffic growth 
will continue on the turnpike and will eventually force another effort to deal with the problem.  
Until a better way is found to deal with this clash of values and implement the traffic strategies 
ten years of studies indicate would work, the only certainty is that congestion on the turnpike 
will continue and transform the highway into the something resembling the Southeast 
Expressway through downtown Boston at rush hour precisely what most widening opponents 
fear Maine will look like with a wider turnpike. And the Maine economy will be noticeably 
smaller than it would be otherwise. The turnpike will have become the road along which Maine 
loses, whichever direction you travel.  
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